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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A DOCTRINAL INNOVATION*
THE right of privacy,' adopted by statute 2 or judicial decision 3 in twenty-
two states, provides indirect protection of a person's commercial interest in
his popularity.4 This doctrine generally allows an individual to enjoin and
*Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1953).
1. On the right of privacy generally, see Warren & Brandeis, Righi to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890); Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 Iu-. L. Rcv. 237 (1932);
Nizer, Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developnwnts, 39 MIcH. L. Rnv. 526 (1941);
Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 Norarn DAis L,w. 499 (1952).
2. N.Y. Civi, RIGnTs LAw §§ 50, 51 (1938); UTAH CODE Ami. § 764-8 et seq.
(1953); VA. CoDE ArN. § 8-650 (1950). The New York statute is typical:
"Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or purposes of trade without the written consent first ob-
tained ... may maintain an equitable action ... against the person... so using
... to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reasons of such use....."
Section 2(c) of the Federal-Trade Mark (Lanham) Act denies registration as trade
symbols to names or pictures of persons whose consent has not been secured. 69 STAT. 423
(1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (1946).
3. Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala.
250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948) ; Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133
(1945) ; Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) ; Cason v. Baskdn, 155
Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944) ; Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 1M Ga. 190,
50 S.E. 68 (1905) ; Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) ;
Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 833, 172 Pac. 532 (1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky.
424, 120 SAV. 364 (1909) ; Itzovich v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) ; Pallas v.
Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Martin v. Dorton, 210
Miss. 668, 50 So2d 391 (1950) ; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076
(1911); Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1952); Bednarik v. Bednaril,
18 N.J. 'Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (1940); Flaker v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 7O, 195
S.E. 55 (1938); Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Executive Bd., 20 Ohio Ops. 473
(1941) ; Hinish v. 'Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 4 2, 113 P2d 433 (1941); Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940). Cf. McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 99 Colo.
499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936) (giving effect to right on theory of implied contract).
4. Prior to the birth of this right, the popularity of a famous person's name or picture,
though of potential utility as an advertising device, rarely received legal protection. See,
e.g., Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112, 50 Eng. Rep. 759 (1848) ; Dockrell v. Dougall, 78
L.T. 840 (Q.B. 1898). Cf., Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 5W, (A
N.E. 442 (1902). Where a person's likeness was painted or photographed, cuurts would
imply a promise by the artist not to use the picture without the subject's consent. Moore
v. Rugg, 44 'Minn. 28, 46 N.W. 141 (1890); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345
(1888); Stedall v. Houghton, 18 Times L.R. 126 (Ch. D. 1901). See Warren & Brandeis,
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 213 (1M90). More recently, some courts have used
property rationale to accomplish the same result. E.g., Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg.
Co., 73 NJ. Eq. 136, 67 At. 392 (1907) ; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.V.
1076 (1911). Cf. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass.
1934), aff'd, 81 F-2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 670 (1936). For criticism of
this indirect approach to the right of privacy, see Nizer, Right of Privacy: A Half Century's
Developn zets, 39 .AicE. L. REv. 526, 536 (1941). In all cases not involving an artist hired
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receive damages for the unauthorized commercial use of his name or like-
ness.5 But a famous person may prefer popularity with a price tag to
protection from publicity. And, paradoxically, the threat of an action grounded
upon the right of privacy may compel payment from advertisers for use of
a name or picture. However, since the right of privacy was designed primarily
to protect an individual's interest in being let alone,0 it is held to be personal I
and non-assignable.8 An advertising licensee is, therefore, unable to invoke
the right of privacy to prevent use of the famous person's name or likeness
by third parties.9
But the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge
Frank, recently held that an individual has, independent of the right of privacy,
rights in his name or picture which can be granted to an exclusive licensee.10
by the subject, however, an individual ordinarily could not complain of unauthorized use
of his name or picture in the absence of defamation, Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F,2d
154 (2d Cir. 1936), or unfair competition, King Pharr Canning Operations v. Pharr Can-
ning Co., 85 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
5. Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (dam-
ages); Brent v. Morgan, 221 Ky, 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (damages); Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D.&C. 543 (1940) (injunction).
6. The "right to be let alone" was the phrase used by Warren and Brandeis in their
pioneer article on the right of privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rxv. 193, 205 (1890). Subsequent
commentators have suggested that this phrase is too narrow to describe the totality of
diverse interests protected by the right, contending that the right should be analyzed il
terms of such personality interests as name, picture, life history, feeling, and emotions.
Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. Ray. 237 (1932). The phrase "interest in being
let alone" is used here for lack of a better phrase to describe the totality of ways in which
an individual may wish to protect himself from the public gaze, as opposed to a person's
"commercial interest" in being paid for publicity.
7. See Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N.Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. Ct.
1911) ("The peculiarly personal character of the cause of action . . . negatives the idea
that the legislature intended that it should be enforceable by the personal representatives
of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed.") ; Von Thodorovich v. Franz
Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 Fed. 911, 912 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907) (Consul of Austria not
allowed to invoke right of privacy of his Emperor; relief granted on other grounds).
Courts split on the question of whether an individual may invoke the right of privacy of a
deceased relative to prevent publicity about that person. Compare Metter v, Los Angeles
Examiner, 35 Cal. App.Zd 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939) (relief denied), with Bazemore v.
Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (relief granted). But this question
may be more realistically viewed as involving the privacy interest of the living relative.
See Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Develotwnts, 39 Micu. L. REV.
526, 555 (1941).
8. Pekas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N.Y.L.J. 1864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915), 28 HARv. L. Rav. 689;
cf. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bardsky Co., 78 F.2d 763, (5th Cir. 1936). See Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953).
9. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
10. Although the Second Circuit spoke only of photographs, the court probably intended
the decision to apply to names as well. The reasons given by the court for recognizing
the right, note 13 infra, justify protection of names as well as photographs. Further, the
cases which the court cites in support of the right of publicity, note 14 infra, involved
persons' names rather than pictures.
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In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chc'wing Gum Co."1 a bubble gum manu-
facturer who had obtained contracts with big-league baseball players for the
exclusive right to use their names and likenesses in connection with the sale
of gum or candy sought to enjoin defendant who subsequently used these ad-
vertising devices in the promotion of its candy.12 Defendant had argued that
the ball players possessed no legal interest in their photographs other than
the right of privacy, which could not be assigned to plaintiff. But the court
stated that, in addition to his privacy right, a man has a "right in the publicity
value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of pub-
lishing his picture."
1 3
11. 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
12. Plaintiff had alleged in the district court that defendant had infringed plaintiff's
common-law trade mark "Baseball" by using it on candy wrappers; that defendant was
engaging in unfair competition by "passing off" its candy as that of plaintiff's; and that
defendant had invaded rights given plaintiff by his exclusive contract with the layers.
The district court denied relief on all counts: it held that the name "baseball" %.as generic,
and could not be appropriated as a trade mark; that there w.-as ni proof of consumers
being deceived by the similarity in advertising; and that plaintiff's contracts with the
players gave it no rights against third parties, on the theory that a personal name
cannot be "assigned in gross." Bowman Gum v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 103 F. Supp. 944
(E.D.N.Y. 1952). On appeal, the plaintiffs dropped their charges of trade mark infringe-
ment and unfair competition.
13. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Judge Swan concurred only in so much of the opinion as dealt with defendant's liability
for inducing breach of contract.
Hae/an is the first case e-xpressly to recognize a "right of publicity." The Second
Circuit cited as authority Liebigs Extract of 'Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 18u Fed.
688 (2d Cir. 1910), which held that the exclusive licensee of the name "Liebig" could
prevent its use on competing products. But it is not clear whether the result is based "n
the exclusive contract, or on trade name infringement dvctrine. Another case vhich
lays the foundation for the decision is Uproar Co. v. National Droadcasting Co., 8 F.
Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), aff'd, 81 F2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denicd, 298 U.S. o70 (1936),
where the court held a radio station had a "property right" in the name of a radio
announcer with whom it had an exclusive contract. But that case can be distinguished
from Haelan on the grounds that there the court placed great weight on the fact that the
station had, through expenditure of time and money, created "good will" in the name,
which a third party had appropriated. Two cases seem opposed to the right of publicity:
Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F2d 763 (5th Cir. 1936); and Pehas Co.
v. Leslie, 52 N.Y.L.J. 1864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915). The Second Circuit chose not to follow
the Hanna case, and distinguished Pekas on the grounds that there the court's attention
was drawn exclusively to the right of privacy, which it held non-assignablei and did
not consider other rights which a person may have in his name or picture.
The Court gave no reason for recognizing the right of publicity other than that
famous people would often receive no money for the use of their names and pictures
unless they could grant a licensee protection against third parties. The cases which the
Court cites in support of the right, Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 22 N.Y. 83, 118 N.E. 214
(1917); and Madison Square Garden v. Universal Pictures, 255 App. Div. 459, 4G5, 7
N.Y.S2d 845, 851 (1st Dept. 1938), indicate that the Court felt it was folloving a legal
"principle" of granting legal protection as "property" to "rights" which have acquired
"pecuniary value." In the Madison Square Garden case the Court gave protection on
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This new right of publicity allows a licensee of a famous person adequate
protection against third parties. Traditionally, direct action by the licensee
against such parties was permitted where they had induced breach of the
contract. 14 And, in addition, use of a name or picture could be enjoined where
continued use constituted trademark infringement.1" Otherwise the licensee's
such a theory to the owner of the Garden against defendant who falsely represented
that movies were taken in the Garden Arena. And in Duff-Gordon, the court, in up-
holding a contract for the exclusive use of a person's name for advertising purposes,
implied that such use had commercial value. Apparently the Second Circuit felt that
Madison Square Garden plus Duff-Gordon equals the right of publicity.
The view that the law protects people against appropriation of values which they have
created received impetus in the case of International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215 (1918), which gave plaintiff relief against defendant who copied news from
plaintiff's bulletins and sold it to the public. While Haelan; appears to approve of an
extension of this doctrine, the Second Circuit previously held that the News Service
case should be limited to the case of news. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. 35 F.2d
279 (2d Cir. 1929); R.C.A. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). For discussion of
possible circularity in the view that courts protect "rights which have pecuniary value,"
see Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. REv. 809,
814-17 (1935).
In the principal case, the court indicated that the "right of publicity" may not have all
the usual attributes of a "property right ;" for it reserved the question whether and how
far defendant would have been liable if he had no knowledge of plaintiff's contract.
14. Active inducement must be proved; mere proof that defendant entered into a
contract the performance of which required a breach of plaintiff's contract is usually not
enough. Sweeney v. Smith, 167 Fed. 385 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1909), aff'd, 171 Fed. 645 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 215 U.S. 600 (1909). But see Wade v. Culp, 107 Ind. App. 503, 23 N.E. 2d
615 (1939). See, generally, PRossEn, TORTS § 104 (1941); Harper, Interference witth
Contractual Relations, 47 N.U.L. REv. 873 (1953).
In the Haelan case, defendant had contracted with some of the players through its own
agent. Here the court held that defendant would be liable for any breach of plaintiff's
contracts thus induced. But defendant had also purchased from an independent party
contract rights to use other of the players' names and pictures. Further, plaintiff alleged
that defendant had used certain players' photographs and names without their consent.
Here the rationale of inducement to breach was not available, but the court held that
the right of publicity was applicable.
15. Societe Anonyme v. Pasteur Chamberland Co., 8 T.M. Rep. 298 (S.D. Ohio 1918);
cf. King Pharr Canning Operations v. Pharr Canning Co., 85 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Ark.
1949). See CAULMAN, UNFAIR COMPMT10N AND TRaDE MARIKS, § 77.4(d) (2d ed. 1950);
N ms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS, C. VI (4th ed. 1947); Pike, Personal
Names as Trade Symbols, 3 Mo. L. Rnv. 93, 101 (1938).
The licensee might have an unfair competition action against a third party who falsely
claims the indorsement of the licensor. Though false advertising is not generally regarded
as a tort, Callman, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COL. L. RIEv. 876 (1948),
the seller of a unique product has been granted relief against a competitor who falsely
represented that his product had the qualities of plaintiff's on the theory that plaintiff, be-
cause of his monopoly position, was clearly damaged by defendant's action. Ely-Norris
Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273
U.S. 132 (1927). On the same theory, perhaps a licensee who has obtained the "exclusive"
indorsement of a famous person can prevent others from falsely claiming that person's
indorsement. But cf. American Washboard v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir.
1900).
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remedy had to be against his licensor.16 And in all cases damages-presumably
based on lost profits '-would be difficult to prove.'8  The Haclan case
appears to sidestep most of these difficulties. While the Second Circuit did
not indicate what relief the right of publicity commands, the court suggestel
that an injunction, in addition to damages, might be "justified." '
But Haelan's right of publicity probably gives a famous person more than
the right to assign a protectible interest in his name or picture. By allowing
an individual to make a grant of the publicity value of his name or photograph,
the Haelan case gave protection to persons' commercial interest in their per-
sonality independent of their privacy interest. In so doing, Haclan implied
that such commercial interest, aside from any privac)y interest, might justify
legal protection of an individual against unauthorized use of his name or picture.
While a famous person can generally invoke the right of privacy against an
advertiser who appropriates his name or picture without permission, ' this
right may not always afford adequate protection to his commercial interest
in his personality. Celebrities complaining of the unauthorized use of their
names or likenesses have sometimes been held, in effect, to have waived their
right of privacy because they sought and received publicity in the past.2
1
And where relief has been granted under the privacy doctrine it is not clear
whether plaintiffs have recovered damages for injury to the commercial intere't
in their popularity.2 2 But if the publicity value of a famous person's name
16. Conceivably, the advertiser could require the licensor to promise to invoke his
right of privacy against a third party who uses his name or picture without the licensor's
consent. But such a promise might be held unenforceable as encouraging litigation. See
CORBIN, CoNmAcrs § 1428 (1951). Moreover, the licensor might be held to have '%aivcd"
his right of privacy by consenting to the use of his name or picture for advertising in the
first place. See cases cited note 22 infra.
17. Cf. Gonzales v. Rivera, 37 N.M. 562, 25 P.2d 802 (1933) (allowing recvery for
loss of profits resulting from breach of promise not to compete) ; Vood v. Pender-Doxey
Grocery Co., 151 Va. 706, 144 S.E. 635 (1928) (same). For general discussion of damages,
see 5 CORBIN, Co-rRAcrs § 990 et seq. (1941).
18. For discussion of methods and difficulty of proving loss of profit from breach of
contract, see Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1950). For problems of proof of loss of profits
from trademark and trade name infringement, see CAL.ILUA, UMTAM Co1.Lnrrnoi; 2Lim
TRA E MAs, § 89.3 (1950).
19. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 866, S69, 570 (2d Cir.
1953).
20. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
21. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), ccrt. denied, 315 U.S.
823 (1942) (football player denied injunction against use of picture in beer advertise-
ment on grounds, ister alic, that by deliberately seeking wide publicity he had "ceased
to be a private person") ; Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Ops. 338, 26 Ohio L.
Abs. 67 (1938) (relief denied to famous actress complaining of use of picture in adver-
tising); Cf. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E2d 485 (1952)
(entertainer denied recovery for unauthorized, sponsored telecast of performance; con-
curring judge stated that right of privacy lost by public performance).
22. Harris v. H. S. Gossard Co., 194 App. Div. 6S3, 185 N.Y. Supp. C61 (1st Dept.
1921) (actress who had received prior publicity and admitted that present advertising
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or picture is to be shielded without reference to the right of privacy, these
celebrities will be fully protected: prior publicity will enhance rather than bar
relief. They will be able to obtain an injunction or recover damages com-
mensurate with the advertising value of their names or pictures. 23
And the right of publicity may be extended beyond advertising cases. A
famous person may wish to prevent appropriation of the public appeal of his per-
sonality by a telecast reproduction of his performance, 24 a biography,
25 or by use
of his photograph for illustrating newspapers or magazines.2
0 Here, as in the
advertising situation, the right of privacy has sometimes been considered
waived because of plaintiff's past exposure in the public limelight,
21 but thi
would not be a ground for denying relief under the right of publicity. And,
where courts have sometimes held that plaintiff's privacy interest was out-
helped her, awarded six cents damages for unauthorized use of name and picture In
advertising). Cf. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944) (where plaintiff's
character used in fictional novel, privacy complaint sustained, but claim to share In
profits dismissed). But cf. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 438, 106
N.Y.S.2d 553, 560, aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (where animal trainer's
performance televised without his consent, privacy complaint dismissed, but dicta that
where plaintiff establishes cause of action for invasions of his privacy, he may recover
for damage to his commercial interest as well) ; Redmond v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,
277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636 (1938) (professional golfer, whose trick shot exhibition
displayed in a movie without his consent, awarded $1,500 damages).
23. See discussion of this view in SPING, RIsxs AND RIGHTS IN PU11LISUIING, LrC.
§§ 15, 192 (1952).
24. E.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Peterson v.
K.M.T.R. Radio Corp., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1949); Chavez v. Holly-
wood Post No. 43, 16 U.S.L. Wzm 2362 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1948).
25. E.g., Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Jeffries v. New
York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
26. E.g., Larhiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ;
Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't 1950).
27. "[Plaintiff's] grievance here is not the invasion of his 'privacy'-privacy is the
one thing he did not want or need in his occupation [as animal trainer]. His real com-
plaint, but one we cannot redress in this suit . . . is that he was not paid for the tele-
casting of his show." Desmond, J., concurring in Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y.
354, 361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952). See also Peterson v. K.M.T.R. Radio Corp., 18
U.S.L. W'FK 2044 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1949); Chavez v. Hollywood Post No. 43, 16 U.S.
L. WEEK 2362 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1948).
It is possible that plaintiffs could have recovered in these cases had they invoked
unfair competition or property doctrine. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. K.Q.V. Broad-
casting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (owner of ball park held to have a
"property right" in the news value of the ball game; can control dissemination of
reports of the game for reasonable time following the game) ; Metropolitan Opera Ass'n
v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951) (opera company granted
relief against unauthorized recording of opera on theory of unfair competition). But cf.
National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (owner
of ball park claiming unfair competition denied relief against unauthorized broadcast of
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weighed by the public's interest in news or information,2 the balance may
now swing in plaintiff's favor if both his privacy and publicity interests are
considered.29
Haelan, however, does not decide whether the right of publicity protects
only the commercial value of fame. If so limited, the right may affurd incom-
plete relief in non-advertising cases. For a person's performance, life history,
or photograph may have commercial value not only because of his fame, but
also because of its inherent educational or entertainment value. But it is not
likely that the Second Circuit intended to shield the value of fame alone; if
this were the limit of Haeldan's thrust, an unknown artist could not invoke the
right of publicity to protect his commercially valuable attributes. The "pub-
licity value of his photograph ' 30 probably refers not merely to the advertising
force of fame, but rather to the total potential advertising value of his name
or likeness. Similarly, an unknown person's life story or performance may
have "publicity value" in aiding the promotion of the book, magazine, or radio
or television program in which it appears.
Even though courts may read the right of publicity as merely allowing a
person to grant a protectible interest in his name or picture, the Second Cir-
cuit's granting of protection to a commercial interest in one's personality sepa-
game because no competition between owner and broadcaster; court rejectcd property
theory). See Comment, 48 YAix L.J. 288 (1938); Note, 35 VA. L. Rnv. 254 (1949).
Where a person's performance has "artistic quality" common law copyright dqctrinm
may give him relief against unauthorized reproduction. See Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp.
338 (D.N.C. 1939); Waring v. W.D.A.S. Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ad.
631 (1937). But once a performer consents to a reproduction, he may b? held to have
lost his copyright by "publication' so that he cannot control subscquent use of the repro-
duction. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). See Solinger,
Unauthorized Use of Telecasts, 48 COL L. REv. 84 (1948).
28. While the right of privacy is considered "vaived" when the court feels an
individual's privacy interest is outweighed by the public's interest in news or information
about his activities, Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926) ; Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113
F.2d 860 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), this "waiver" merely permits
news reporting, not advertising, see e.g., Pavesich v. ,New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122
Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Foster-Milburn v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1969);
Pallas v. Crowley, Millner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 NAV.2d 911 (1948). See Nizer,
The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 Micar. L. Rnv. 526, 547 (1941).
However, where a person has sought and received wide publicity, he may he held to
have relinquished his right of privacy even for advertising purposes. See cases cited
note 22 svpra.
29. The public's interest probably should be deemed paramount in many non-adver-
tising cases. Extending the "right of publicity" to its logical limit would prevent any
appropriation of values created by another-a result which may conflict with the policy
of federal copyright and patent laws. See, e.g., R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1940) (denying relief to performer against unauthorized distribution of
recordings of his performance); Chaffee, Unfair Competition, 53 H.n. L RLv. 129,
1317-20 (1940); Zlinkoff, Monopoly vcrsus Competition: Significant Trends in Patcnt,
Azti-Trust, Trademhark and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YAi. I.J. 514 (1944).
30. See text at note 13 supra.
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rate from a privacy interest is doctrinally important. In applying the right of
privacy, courts have confused commercial interests with privacy interests.
The result of making one doctrine do the work of two has been inadequate
protection for both these interests in personality. The right of privacy gives
inadequate protection to the commercial interest in one's personality because
courts have placed upon the right limitations which are appropriate only to
the privacy interest. 31 Similarly, in some states the right of privacy gives inade-
quate protection even to the privacy interest because courts and legislatures
have implied that commercial benefit to the defendant is an element of the
cause of action. 32 If courts wish to protect both interests to at least some extent,
they should do so under separate doctrines, so that limitations appropriate to
each interest may be imposed. The Haelan case takes a long step in this
direction.
JOSEPH R. GRODINt
31. See cases cited in notes, 7, 8, 22 supra.
32. The right of privacy statutes, patterned after that of New York, note 2 supra,
prevent unauthorized use of a person's name or picture only for purposes of "advertising
or trade." In interpreting these statutes, courts have been inclined to look to the motives
of the user in deciding whether a particular use is primarily for trade or advertising pur-
poses, or for educational or informational purposes. E.g., Callas v. Whisper, 198 Misc.
829, 101 N.Y.S2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Kline v. McBride & Co., 170 Misc. 974, 11
N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp.
382 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Even in states which recognize the right of privacy at common
law the commercial element is sometimes stressed. E.g., Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285,
288, 297 Pac. 91, 93. (1931) ("The right of action accrues only when the publication
is made for profit. (This, however, is questioned by some cases)").
tMember of the Class of 1954, Yale Law School.
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